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REFLECTIONS ON CHAIRING THE NEW YORK
STATE COMMISSION ON GOVERNMENT
INTEGRITY
John D. Feerick*
We will never bring disgrace to this our city
by any act of dishonesty or cowardice,
nor ever desert our suffering comrades in the ranks;
We fight for the ideals and the sacred things of the city,
both alone and with many;
We will revere and obey the city's laws and
do our best to incite to a like respect and reverence
those who are prone to annul or set them at naught;
We will strive unceasingly to quicken
the public sense of public duty;
That thus, in all these ways, we will transmit this city
not only not less, but greater, better and more beautiful
than it was transmitted to us.'
The New York State Commission on Government Integrity (Com-
mission) was born from a sense of crisis. A series of corruption scan-
dals in New York State, involving officials at all levels of government,
produced widespread cynicism and distrust of government and cre-
ated a perception that unethical, if not illegal, practices were rampant
throughout the State. The scandals implicated borough presidents of
New York City, political party chairmen, municipal officials, mem-
bers of the State Legislature, judges and a host of other officials.
As the law enforcement community responded to the allegations of
political corruption, Governor Mario Cuomo and Mayor Edward
Koch appointed a sixteen-member State-City Commission on Integ-
rity in Government, otherwise known as the Sovern Commission.
The Commission was asked to make recommendations for improving
laws relating to the prevention of corruption, favoritism, undue influ-
ence and abuse of official position in government. While the Sovern
* Chairman, New York State Commission on Government Integrity; Dean, Ford-
ham University School of Law. B.A. 1958, J.D. 1961, Fordham University; member of
the 1963 American Bar Association conference on Presidential Inability and Vice Presi-
dential Vacancy, the recommendations from which culminated in the 25th Amendment
to the United States Constitution. -
1. The Athenian Oath, reprinted in INTERNATIONAL CITY MANAGEMENT ASSOCIA-
TION, THE ETHICS FACTOR HANDBOOK (May, 1988).
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Commission made a number of concrete proposals of its own, it also
suggested that a non-partisan commission be formed with subpoena
power to delve into government impropriety, to provide the fullest
possible disclosure of the inner workings of government in light of the
then current "crisis in confidence," and to address both the reality
and appearance of government corruption. Consistent with these rec-
ommendations, the New York State Commission on Government In-
tegrity was created and granted subpoena power and a sweeping
statewide mandate.
The Executive Order creating the Commission2 directed it to inves-
tigate weaknesses in existing laws, regulations and procedures relating
to such areas as campaign financing, judicial selection, conflicts of in-
terest, the solicitation of government business and approvals, and the
use of public and political party positions for personal enrichment.
The Commission's charter directed it to recommend to the Governor
action to remedy any inadequacies in existing laws that permit cor-
ruption to exist. The Executive Order also required the Commission
to avoid jeopardizing on-going investigations and prosecutions and to
communicate to law enforcement authorities any evidence which it
obtained of criminal wrongdoing. In the main, the Commission was
asked to bridge the gap between the work of district attorneys and the
need for system-wide reforms that go beyond single cases of official
misconduct.
When Governor Cuomo created the Commission in January, 1987,
under authority given to him by the Moreland Act,3 legislators
balked, indicating that they would not fund the Commission. The
Governor responded by threatening to raise funds from private
sources in order to enable the Commission to perform its work. The
resulting controversy continued over many weeks until it was resolved
in April by agreement between the Governor and State Legislature.
The Legislature agreed to provide funding for the Commission in
the amount of $5 million, specifying that none of the funds could be
used for the investigation of the management or affairs of the Legisla-
ture. This limitation, unfortunately, itself damaged confidence in gov-
ernment, since it was subject to the interpretation that members of the
Legislature had something to hide. It also was unnecessary because
the Commission's Executive Order did not reach the affairs of legisla-
2. Exec. Order No. 88.1, N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 9, § 4.88 (1987). See
NEW YORK STATE COMMISSION ON GOVERNMENT INTEGRITY, RESTORING THE PUB-
LIC TRUST: A BLUEPRINT FOR GOVERNMENT INTEGRITY Appendix A (September
1990) [hereinafter BLUEPRINT], reproduced infra at 246 (executive order reprinted).
3. N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 6 (McKinney 1982).
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tors as legislators, as opposed to their private activities. Nor did the
Executive Order reach the affairs of the Judiciary.4
In addition, the Legislature insisted that Commission members be
residents of New York State, which resulted in the displacement of
Joseph A. Califano, Jr., as Chairman, and Howard Simons, as a mem-
ber, of the Commission. This initial dismantling of the Commission
was exceedingly harmful. It not only removed two outstanding indi-
viduals from the Commission but it generated concerns that the re-
constituted Commission might not be effective in pursuing its
mandate. It also raised questions regarding the Legislature's inten-
tions for the Commission.
As finally constituted in April, 1987, the Commission consisted of
me as chair and Richard D. Emery, Patricia M. Hynes, Judge Ber-
nard S. Meyer, Bishop Emerson J. Moore, James L. Magavern, and
Cyrus R. Vance as members.5 In turn, the Commission assembled an
outstanding staff of lawyers, investigators and others to perform the
essential day-to-day work of investigating state and local govern-
ment.6 The Commission drew into its work on a pro-bono basis as its
special counsel Thomas J. Schwarz, head of the litigation department
at Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom and a national authority on
campaign finance reform.
The Commission, as noted, received its authority from the More-
land Act and the powers set forth in Sections 6 and 63 (subsection 8)
4. See BLUEPRINT, supra note 2, at Appendix A, reproduced infra at 246. The
Moreland Act authorizes the Governor, by establishing a Commission, to investigate the
management and affairs of any department, board, bureau or commission of the state -
not other branches of government, however. N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 6 (McKinney 1982).
Under section 63, subsection 8 of the Executive Law, the governor may direct the attor-
ney-general to inquire into matters concerning the public peace, public safety and public
justice and to appoint deputies to do so. N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 63(8) (McKinney 1982).
The powers granted under section 63 have been used to authorize investigations at the
local level. Moreland Act Commissions, such as the Commission on Government Integ-
rity, have been granted powers at times under both sections.
5. The six Commissioners with whom I served all enjoyed outstanding reputations
for exceptional distinction in their respective fields: Richard Emery, as a prominent civil
libertarian; Patricia Hynes, as a former executive assistant and chief of the official corrup-
tion and special prosecution unit for the United States Attorney's Office for the Southern
District of New York; Judge Bernard Meyer, as a former member of the New York State
Court of Appeals; Bishop Emerson Moore, as a prominent member of the Roman Catho-
lic Church in the Archdiocese of New York; James Magavern, as a lawyer and leader in
ethics reform in upstate New York; and Cyrus Vance, as a former Secretary of State in
the administration of President Jimmy Carter.
6. See NEW YORK STATE COMMISSION ON GOVERNMENTINTEGRITY, INTEGRITY
AND ETHICAL STANDARDS IN NEW YORK STATE GOVERNMENT: FINAL REPORT TO
THE GOVERNOR at Appendix C [hereinafter FINAL REPORT], reproduced infra at 279.
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of the New York State Executive Law.7 These powers authorized the
Commission to investigate not only departments of state government
but also political subdivisions of the State. Predecessor Moreland Act
Commissions had investigated, exposed and improved the functioning
of New York State government since 1907.8 For the most part, they
focused on specific areas of inquiry or specific departments of govern-
ment. It does not appear that any Commission was given as broad a
mandate as the Commission on Government Integrity.
At the time the Commission was created and in testimony before
the Commission in September, 1987, Governor Cuomo urged that it
help convert a scandal-ridden period into one of enlightenment and
reform. He said: "I believe that a continued commitment to improve-
ment by our Legislature, a persistent, undeviating emphasis on reform
by the executive - together with your help - can make this the be-
ginning of the most exciting reform era in this state's history."9
In an effort to provide such assistance, the Commission conducted,
during its forty-month existence, a large number of investigations and
public hearings across the State and laid out in twenty reports its find-
ings of what is wrong and recommendations for reform.'" In seven
reports, the Commission presented a complete picture of campaign
financing in New York State, finding current laws and procedures to
be so inadequate and outmoded that they undermined public confi-
dence and integrity in government. The Commission also made a se-
ries of recommendations in these reports which would provide an
enlightened government with a blueprint for campaign finance
reform.
In other reports, the Commission made recommendations on a
wide range of subjects: closing loopholes in the State's Ethics in Gov-
ernment Act;" abolishing judicial elections for full time trial courts;
reforming the laws governing how candidates get on the ballot in state
primaries; addressing inadequacies in the State's Open Meetings
Law;' 2 limiting the influence of political patronage on certain person-
nel procedures and practices; changing the way New York State gives
funds to and monitors private drug treatment providers; and strength-
7. N.Y. EXEC. LAW §§ 6, 63(8) (McKinney 1982).
8. See generally E. BREUER, MORELAND ACT INVESTIGATIONS IN NEW YORK:
1907-65 (1965); J.E. MISSALL, THE MORELAND ACT (1946).
9. Testimony of Governor Mario M. Cuomo before the New York State Commis-
sion on Government Integrity (September 9, 1987).
10. The Commission reports and hearings are listed in FINAL REPORT, supra note 6,
at Appendix B, reproduced infra at 274.
11. Ethics in Government Act, ch. 813, 1987 N.Y. Laws 1404.
12. N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAW §§ 100-111 (McKinney 1988).
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ening the Whistleblower Law of the State.13
In its final report to Governor Cuomo, dated September, 1990,14
the Commission made a number of overall findings, two of which
were that the laws of New York State fall woefully short in guarding
against political abuses in an alarming number of areas; and that New
York has not yet demonstrated a real commitment to government
ethics reforms. The report concluded with the Commission urging
the leaders of the State to act before the emergence of new scandals
and to give ethics reforms the emphasis which they deserve.
Now that the Commission's work is ended, I welcome the opportu-
nity to share some personal reflections on the experience of the past
several years. To begin with I found the experience to be the most
difficult, challenging, frustrating and rewarding of my life. Let me
explain.
The Commission's start-up proved to be exceedingly difficult. This
was so for several reasons. First, it was not clear how long the Com-
mission would last, or indeed whether it would be funded again."
This presented a challenge in the recruitment of a staff of lawyers who
would be expected to leave permanent positions elsewhere to join the
Commission. The challenge was compounded by the fact that the
Commission had been battered by the circumstances surrounding its
creation, and the breadth of its mandate left uncertain just what it
would investigate. In his remarks at the time he established the Com-
mission, Governor Cuomo spoke strongly of making this an era of
reform. Yet, as the Commission started up, it seemed that many ele-
ments of the community wanted it to serve more like a prosecutorial
or inquisitorial body. Such a role was neither sanctioned by the Exec-
utive Order nor necessary because of the rigorous steps being taken at
the time by the United States Attorney's Office for the Southern and
Eastern Districts of New York and by the Manhattan District Attor-
ney's Office. A prosecutorial role also was not possible because the
13. N.Y. CIV. SERV. LAW § 75-b (McKinney 1987).
14. FINAL REPORT, supra note 6, reproduced infra at 251.
15. There was always a certain tension surrounding this subject. Although the Com-
mission finally received an appropriation of $5 million in April, 1987, an unsuccessful
effort was made in 1988 to deny the Commission refunding. See N.Y.S. 7828, 21 1th Sess.
(1988). In 1989, as the State dealt with its fiscal health, the Commission along with other
state entities was encouraged to reduce its budget, which it did, seeking only $2.5 million
at that time. The Commission was able to complete its work after its funds ran out in
February, 1990 only because of the pro bono contributions of the Commissioners and
special counsel and their firms, and the invaluable support services provided by Fordham
University, including making available office space to the Commission.
1990-91]
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XVIII
Commission was given no power to grant immunity and, as previ-
ously noted, it was required by its Executive Order to refer to the law
enforcement community any evidence which it obtained of criminal
wrongdoing. The Commission essentially was directed to investigate
issues calling for sweeping reforms in law by documenting the need
for such reforms. A fact-finding role was clearly mandated by the
Executive Order, and by the reasons publicly stated by the appointing
authority for establishing the Commission. 6
The Commission expressed this view of its role at press conferences
and in other forums but without gaining acceptance for it in some
quarters during the early going. Some people were upset that the
political leaders had created a Commission instead of dealing directly
and immediately with the issues raised by the corruption scandals.
The pervasiveness of the scandals and the anger they produced among
the people of the State led some to criticize the Commission for not
taking bold steps immediately. Little recognition was given to the
practical need for the Commission to recruit a staff, develop an
agenda, and open and complete investigations before it could respon-
sibly address issues of government ethics in New York State. These
criticisms served to harm the Commission because they occurred at a
time when it needed to build confidence that it would render an im-
portant public service against the backdrop of a poisoned political
atmosphere.
Notwithstanding these early set backs and difficulties, the Commis-
sion resolved from the outset to do its work fairly and thoroughly,
and then to let the chips fall where they may as warranted by its in-
vestigations. Sometimes it would not be appropriate to hold a public
hearing on a subject because of the uncorroborated nature of the in-
formation which it had received.1 7 In another investigation, involving
the City of Albany, the Commission would hold a public hearing, but
not issue a separate report, since the hearing had served to focus nec-
essary public attention on the ethical issues present when public offi-
cials serve simultaneously in government and private positions.' 8
16. At a press conference on April 21, 1987 announcing the Commission, Governor
Cuomo repeatedly underscored the need for the Commission to be an instrument toward
achieving ethics reform. Among other things, he stated that "we have ... an unprece-
dented opportunity to bring about institutional reform, reforms that will protect against
abuse in our government, our political system, and our electoral system." He added:
"Theirs [the Commission] will be 'a new, fresh, clean judgment on the issues," and "be-
cause now we've awakened a call for reform, we have increased the need for the reform
effort to succeed."
17. See Lynn, Ethics Panel Won't Ask Felon to Be a Witness, N.Y. Times, Feb. 23,
1988, at B4, col. 5.
18. A separate report on the Albany City investigation also was not issued because
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Throughout its existence, there was nothing more important to the
Commission than meeting the highest possible professional standards
of fairness and thoroughness in the accomplishment of its mandate. I
recall many times expressing to members of the staff the Commis-
sion's view that we should not conduct ourselves as a "witch hunt" or
as a group interested in immediate headlines at the expense of fair-
ness. The need for fairness was emphasized because of the far reach-
ing nature of the Commission's investigative power. It had wide
discretion to decide what to investigate and when an investigation had
reached a point warranting a public hearing. Moreover, individuals
called to testify at hearings did not have the right to cross-examine or
present witnesses. In a sense, the Commission served as an investiga-
tive body as well as judge and jury. Under such circumstances, the
potential to damage the reputations of people and entities, as well as
to interfere with elections, was considerable. There were few legal
restraints except those the Commission chose to impose on itself.
Looking back at this juncture, I am gratified that the Commission
was able to engage a dedicated and highly professional staff,19 and
that the media of the State came to support, strongly so, the recom-
mendations of the Commission through hundreds of articles and
editorials.2 °
The basis for the Commission's recommendations are described in
the reports which are published in this volume. A few comments here
about some of these reports seem appropriate.
Campaign Financing
In accordance with the direction contained in Executive Order No.
88.1 to investigate the campaign financing laws of New York State,
the Commission devoted its greatest effort to this subject. We con-
the Commission conducted its business from February, 1990 to September, 1990 without
any budget, causing it to limit the reports that could be issued during that period. The
investigation and issues, however, were treated generally in the Commission's reports,
MUNICIPAL ETHICAL STANDARDS: THE NEED FOR A NEW APPROACH (December 29,
1988) and UNDERGROUND GOVERNMENT: PRELIMINARY REPORT ON AUTHORITIES
AND OTHER PUBLIC CORPORATIONS (April 26, 1990).
19. It deserves mention that several members of the Commission's staff subsequently
became executive directors of important government agencies dealing with issues of eth-
ics reform, to wit: Nicole Gordon, of the New York City Campaign Finance Board;
Constance Cushman, of the New York City Procurement Policy Board; and Mark Da-
vies, of the Temporary State Commission on Local Government Ethics. Thomas
McShane was also appointed counsel to the latter Commission and Alexandra Lowe was
designated by New York City Comptroller Elizabeth Holtzman as a member of the Pro-
curement Board.
20. These articles and editorials are on file at the Leo T. Kissam Law Library, Ford-
ham University School of Law.
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eluded early on that there was no more important area affecting confi-
dence in government. After all, in a democracy, holding elective
office is one of the highest forms of public service. We entrust to our
office holders not only the business of government but the ultimate
protection of our liberty and well-being of our citizenry. Impropriety
in the way candidates campaign strikes at the heart of our democratic
system.
Our investigation of the financing of political campaigns in New
York State resulted in widely publicized investigatory hearings in
1988 and 1989. The hearings on campaign financing would not have
been possible without the development by the Commission's staff of a
computerized data base of the information contained in the campaign
finance disclosure filings at the State Board of Elections.2"
We discovered from this massive project that the contribution lim-
its of New York law have not been and cannot be enforced without a
computer system. We also learned of the high correlation in a
number of areas between political contributors and the recipients of
discretionary government benefits, including contracts. The project
also revealed the enormous sums of money being given by corpora-
tions, political action committees and certain individuals.
The decision to develop the data base came after visits by staff
members to the offices of the New York State Elections Board. They
discovered on those occasions that the disclosure reports filed by can-
didates were stored in a remarkably primitive manner, in boxes, in
disarray, and many in a form unintelligible to anyone. This shocking
first-hand observation led the Commission to condemn the adminis-
tration of the State's campaign finance laws and to conclude that the
disclosure laws operated in a manner which hid information from the
public about who contributes to campaigns in the State.
The Commission's investigation of the campaign practices of New
York State Comptroller Ned Regan was initiated after it received
from an unknown source documents prepared by a political aide in
his office. These documents raised serious questions about the rela-
tionship between campaign contributors and the recipients of govern-
mental finance business. This investigation, which extended over a
21. In an effort to lift the veil of secrecy that surrounds political campaigns in New
York, the Commission decided to release to the public campaign contribution and expen-
diture information for state legislators, state-wide and city-wide office holders, state and
legislative party committees, political action committees, the New York City Council,
and New York City borough presidents. This marked the first time in the history of New
York that this information was made publicly available in a format that allows easy anal-
ysis. This work of the Commission has been drawn on by prosecutors and the media in
their continuing work.
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period of many months, ultimately resulted in the hearings at which
the Comptroller was subjected to vigorous questioning based on these
documents. While this investigation was in progress, the Commission
opened investigations examining the campaign finance practices of the
Governor and Attorney General. These investigations did not un-
cover any documents of the kind produced in the case of the Comp-
troller, but they did raise issues which the Commission felt should be
explored with those officials at public hearings. The differences
among the hearings of these respective officials was in keeping with
the results of the investigations of their individual campaign
practices.22
As for the investigation of legislative campaign financing, it was
complicated by the issue of separation of powers - specifically, to
what extent a Moreland Commission could examine legislative lead-
ers regarding the campaign finance practices of legislative party com-
mittees. In order to avoid a long drawn out confrontation on the issue
of its power to require testimony from these officials, the Commission
worked out with them an arrangement under which they were ex-
amined on some subjects. The public hearings which resulted focused
attention on the need for campaign finance reform with respect to the
Legislature, particularly the importance of limiting the size of contri-
butions to legislative party committees. The earlier report by the
Commission, The Albany Money Machine,23 revealed for the first time
in the history of the State the enormous dependence by the Demo-
cratic and Republican parties in the Legislature on campaign contri-
butions from corporations, unions, and PACs - those with an
interest in legislation.
Poughkeepsie '85
The investigation which culminated in "Poughkeepsie '851,24 was
prompted by a Commission visit to that town in the summer of 1987.
An unusually large number of residents of that community informed
us of their feeling that something seriously wrong had taken place in
their Town Board elections of 1985 and that the State's Elections
22. The later criticism that the Commission was not as tough on the Governor as it
was on the Comptroller did not take account of the results of the different investigations.
To have done otherwise, although headline-catching, would have been unjustified - a
fact not readily appreciated or understood at the time.
23. NEW YORK STATE COMMISSION ON GOVERNMENT INTEGRITY, THE ALBANY
MONEY MACHINE: CAMPAIGN FINANCING FOR NEW YORK STATE LEGISLATIVE
RACES (August 2, 1988).
24. NEW YORK STATE COMMISSION ON GOVERNMENT INTEGRITY, POUGHKEEPSIE
'85: A CASE STUDY OF ELECTION LAW ABUSES (June 27, 1990).
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Board had not vigorously sought to uncover the facts. This festering
wound led the Commission to undertake a time-consuming and, as it
turned out, litigation-filled investigation. If there is one case study,
however, that established the shocking nature of New York's cam-
paign finance law, and how it can be cynically manipulated, it is
"Poughkeepsie '85."
Talent Bank
The investigation which led to the report, "Playing Ball with City
Hall,'" was initiated as a result of visits by Commission staff mem-
bers to City Hall in order to collect information on contracting and
personnel practices. In the course of the visits, they learned of the
Talent Bank and of its former director, Nydia Padilla, who no longer
was a City employee. When she came to the Commission's offices for
a routine meeting, she informed us for the first time of the important
documents which she had that pointed to a pervasive system of polit-
ical patronage in the City, and the efforts to hide them from the pub-
lic. The Commission investigation which ensued to determine the
accuracy of the information became a protracted one, in part because
of roadblocks placed in the Commission's way in obtaining docu-
ments and because of the conflicting nature of the information pro-
vided by public employees in their testimony at private Commission
hearings. In the end, the Commission was satisfied with the thor-
oughness of its investigation and therefore noticed the public hearings
which were held in January and April of 1989. It was unfortunate
that the extensive nature of the investigation culminated in an election
year, but any effort to delay the hearings at that point would have
been wrong. The revelations that occurred at the hearings would not
have been possible without the courageous actions of Nydia Padilla,
whose testimony underscored the importance of whistleblower pro-
tections in New York State.
Municipal Ethical Standards
The Commission's report on municipal ethical standards2 6 was con-
sidered by a number of Commissioners to be one of its most signifi-
cant accomplishments, since the area of conflicts of interest in
municipal government had received so little legislative attention at the
25. NEW YORK STATE COMMISSION ON GOVERNMENT INTEGRITY, PLAYING BALL
WITH CITY HALL: A CASE STUDY OF POLITICAL PATRONAGE IN NEW YORK CITY
(August 7, 1989).
26. NEW YORK STATE COMMISSION ON GOVERNMENT INTEGRITY, MUNICIPAL
ETHICS STANDARDS: THE NEED FOR A NEW APPROACH (December 29, 1988).
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State level. The Commission's proposed code was developed after ex-
tensive input from local officials throughout the State. Despite in-
tense opposition to the idea of any such code by various interest
groups, it was gratifying to learn that several New York municipali-
ties had adopted major parts of it on their own initiative and that the
governor had included it in his program bill in the Legislature. The
material gathered by the Commission in the course of this investiga-
tion was turned over to the Temporary State Commission on Local
Government Ethics, which is likely to give strong leadership to re-
form in this area.
Ethics Training
The impetus for this report 27 came from a discussion with the Nel-
son A. Rockefeller College of Affairs and Policy in May, 1987, in
which we were informed that New York State had practically no pro-
grams on ethics training. The Commission thereafter decided to sur-
vey the field by communicating with every state agency and many
New York City agencies. The survey consisted of written inquiries as
to their guidelines and programs with respect to raising ethics con-
sciousness. The survey itself had the positive effect of encouraging
agencies to take steps which they reported in their responses. This
was not the only investigation which had the unusual impact of stimu-
lating change while an investigation was in progress.28
Throughout the life of the Commission, many efforts were made to
thwart its work. They took various forms. Among them were law-
suits brought to hinder the Commission's investigations. 29 Although
the Commission succeeded in defeating these efforts, valuable time
was taken away from its substantive work and significant Commission
27. NEW YORK STATE COMMISSION ON GOVERNMENT INTEGRITY, RAISING OUR
SIGHTS: THE NEED FOR ETHICS TRAINING IN GOVERNMENT (March 1, 1990).
28. For example, the City of Rochester changed its Open Meetings Law on the eve of
Commission hearings, and in the course of our investigation of the secret housekeeping
accounts of the political parties, the Legislature changed the law by opening such ac-
counts to public scrutiny. Rochester, N.Y. City Council Resolution No. 87-35 (October
13, 1987). During the course of the Commission's hearings on campaign financing, state-
wide and city-wide office holders placed restrictions on their campaign financing activi-
ties. Thus, Mayor Koch announced his commitment not to accept more than $3,000
from a corporation and its affiliates combined, and City Comptroller Goldin announced
that he would not accept contributions at all from either corporations or corporate PACs
for his 1989 campaign. Comptroller Regan and Attorney General Abrams also an-
nounced voluntary restrictions on their own fund-raising.
29. See FINAL REPORT, supra note 6, at Appendix D, reproduced infra at 281.
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funds were expended in the process of handling these cases. Fortu-
nately, some of the lawsuits established new legal precedents that will
be helpful to future investigative commissions.30
Another form of resistance to the Commission was reflected in
press statements by public officials and others seeking to attack the
Commission's credibility. It was accused of being partisan, notwith-
standing that as many Democrats as Republicans were the subjects of
Commission investigations. The Commission's recommendations
were condemned as being costly to implement, even though many of
its proposed reforms had no fiscal implications and would actually
save taxpayer dollars. Some officials said that there was no public
outcry for reform, suggesting that there was no reason for change in
advance of scandal and abuse. It also was said that the constituency
in New York State for ethics reform was a small one. Therefore, why
expend time and effort in areas which involved so little political
return?
In addition, the Commission was criticized for not having done
enough to bring about change. I found these criticisms painful be-
cause of the enormous efforts by the Commissioners and staff over a
period of 40 months to achieve, in the face of intense resistance, a
more ethical government in New York State. It seemed that some
critics were more interested in the Commission creating headlines
than substance. The Commission, however, viewed its role as one of
careful investigation before issuing pronouncements, and it was aware
of and sensitive to its potential to damage unfairly the careers and
lives of people in and out of government. The criticisms also did not
take account of the fact that many of the Commission's recommenda-
tions affected those who had the exclusive power to make change,
taking away from incumbent officeholders unfair advantages enjoyed
by them under the present electoral system. In a sense, the Commis-
sion's only real power, through hearings and reports, was to inform
and to raise the consciousness of people. How well it did so, of
course, is for others to judge. The lack of response to important Com-
30. See, e.g., Riker v. New York State Commission on Government Integrity, 153
A.D.2d 158, 550 N.Y.S.2d 459 (3d Dep't 1990) (holding that the strictures of Civil
Rights Law § 73(9) are inapplicable to a Moreland Commission); Spargo v. New York
State Commission on Government Integrity, 140 A.D.2d 26, 531 N.Y.S.2d 417 (3d Dep't
1988) (finding that the Personal Privacy Protection Law did not ban public disclosure of
the contents of an investigative file of the New York State Board of Elections); New York
State Commission on Government Integrity v. Congel, 156 A.D.2d 274, 548 N.Y.S.2d
663 (1st Dep't 1989) (holding that the fourth amendment did not restrict the Commis-
sion's subpoenas duces tecum notwithstanding that the information which was sought
might be probative of criminal wrongdoing), appeal dismissed, 75 N.Y.2d 836, 552
N.E.2d 170, 552 N.Y.S.2d 922 (1990).
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mission recommendations may well be because of the absence of an
authentic desire for reform by powerful special interests in New York
State.3'
Having dealt, perhaps too much, with criticisms, fairness to the
Commission requires me to note, happily, that a large number of its
recommendations have been incorporated into the New York City
Campaign Finance Law, as amended; 32 the uniform guidelines issued
by the New York City Procurement Policy Board; and, as already
noted, the ethics laws passed by various municipalities in the State. In
addition, the Commission's campaign financing work offers the most
in-depth treatment to date of the inner workings of this area in New
York State. But more than specific enactments or work, the Commis-
sion has helped keep alive the cause of ethical reform in New York
State - a not inconsiderable accomplishment given the enormous
resistance to any such reform that manifested itself during the life of
the Commission. The remarks of Elihu Root in 1926 continue to be
instructive:
There are no worse enemies of all attempts at improving the ma-
chinery of government, in any field, state, municipal, national, in-
ternational, than the people who are always in a hurry, who are
dissatisfied if results are not reached today or tomorrow, who think
that if they cannot on the instant see a result accomplished, noth-
ing has been done. The process of civilization is always a process
of building up brick by brick, stone by stone, a structure which is
unnoted for years but finally, in the fruition of time, is the basis for
greater progress. I think it makes but little difference what part of
that process a man contributes his life to. I think it makes but little
difference whether a man gives his life and his service to laying the
foundation and building up the structure, or whether he is the man
that floats a flag on the battlements and cries, Victory!3
Can it be seriously doubted that ethics reforms are vital to the
health of our democracy? Ethics leadership sends a message through-
out the community served by government which is powerful and ben-
eficial. As Justice Brandeis stated: "Our Government is the potent,
the omnipresent teacher. For good or for ill, it teaches the whole
31. Another perspective was provided me by one prominent member of the New
York State Legislature in the fall of 1989. He said in substance that some members of the
Legislature were still angry by the controversies of 1987 and what they consider as the
unfair attacks on their integrity. Therefore, they were not anxious to reopen "old
wounds" by engaging in debate on ethics reforms.
32. Local Law 8 of 1988 (codified as NEW YORK, N.Y. ADMIN. CODE §§ 3-701-3-
714 (1988)).
33. See T. SCHICK, THE NEW YORK STATE CONSTITUTION CONVENTION OF 1915
AND THE MODERN STATE GOVERNOR 133 (1978).
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people by its example."'3 4 A government committed to ethics reform
is more open, more competitive, and less subject to corrupting influ-
ences, and it gains the confidence of the public it serves.
Tragically, the citizens of New York State witnessed during the
1980s the degradation of public service by the wrongdoing of public
servants and party leaders. It would be a mistake to label such mal-
feasance as unique to our times, and it must be acknowledged that
most officials are hard working and honest. But the recent spectacle
of public figures in the prisoners' dock inspires sober reflection on
what behavior we as citizens will accept and what we can do to alter
the state of affairs. When public officials violate the public trust,
much more is at stake than the breaking of the law, for such violations
strike at the very foundations of government.
What should we therefore expect of our public officials? If there is
one answer which resounds over and over again, it is that they act in
the interest of the people, and not in their own self-interest. To be
sure, it is not easy in the present day world of American politics to
convince an incumbent to embrace changes and raise ethical stan-
dards which may limit his or her present power or advantages. Yet,
we are at a point in time when New York's political system demands
such change. It has neglected ethics reform in a large number of areas
for too long.a It is clear what needs to be done. The Commission has
laid out in painstaking detail a blueprint for reform. Its recommenda-
tions as a whole form a guide to a more healthy, honest and demo-
cratic political climate in New York State. We cannot hope to
maintain a democratic system with any integrity if we fail to attack
with vigor and courage the problems that beset us.
Leadership from elected officials alone will not be sufficient to move
New York in the direction it ought to go. Critical to the shaping of
that leadership is the engagement of the people of the State in areas of
government ethics. Legislators need to hear from their constituents
34. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
35. Since the Commission's creation, there have been some positive changes. The
New York City Campaign Finance Law adopted in 1988 under Mayor Koch's leadership
represented pioneering legislation, and the New York City Procurement Policy Board did
good work in laying out for the first time uniform guidelines to govern the expenditure of
public money. Local Law 8 of 1988 (codified as NEW YORK, N.Y. ADMIN. CODE §§ 3-
701-3-714 (1988)). At the State level, there also was the start of a period of ethics reform
in 1987 under Governor Cuomo's leadership with the passage of the Ethics in Govern-
ment Act and the Government Accountability Act. Ethics in Government Act, ch. 813,
1987 N.Y. Law 1404; New York Governmental Accountability Audit and Internal Con-
trol Act of 1987, ch. 814, 1987 N.Y. Laws 1456. In the following years the Governor
placed before the Legislature bills incorporating many of the recommendations of the
Commission, although none was adopted.
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on these issues. Existing citizen groups need to increase their com-
mendable efforts to communicate to state-wide officials the impor-
tance of ethics reforms. New groups need to be formed. Only if
widespread interest is manifested can we realistically expect elected
officials to change the status quo from which they reap so many prac-
tical advantages.
The Commission has pointed the way, now .others must find the
will. It would be a sad commentary on the history of these times if
New York State, after commissioning a wide-ranging, non-partisan
examination of government ethical standards, were to squander the
opportunity for meaningful reform.
In closing, I wish to express my eternal gratitude to my fellow
Commissioners for their help and friendship, to the Commission's
special counsel and staff for helping shape an important agenda for
restoring the public trust.
To my parents, both of whom died during the tenure of my chair-
manship, I dedicate my work for the Commission, hoping it will con-
tribute in some meaningful way to a better New York. They
emigrated from County Mayo, Ireland, to the United States as teenag-
ers in the 1920s and spent their adult years in New York, helping and
serving others with devotion and integrity.
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